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III. Anti-Western Tendencies in Post-Soviet Russia and  
Their Historical Roots (1) 
 
 
Rosalind Marsh  
 
The “New Political Novel” by Right-Wing Writers in 
Post-Soviet Russia 
 
 
 
 
Most Western commentators claim that literature and politics have moved 
irrevocably apart into two separate spheres in the post-Soviet period. 
However, I have argued in my recent book (Marsh 2007) that the end of the 
1990s and the beginning of the new millennium witnessed the emergence of 
what I would term “the new political novel,” encompassing writers of many 
different political viewpoints – from Aleksandr Prokhanov’s national-
patriotic and anarcho-communist attacks on governmental mechanisms of 
oppression to Aleksandr Tsvetkov’s hostility to global capitalist production 
and the power of the mass media. This suggests that Russian literature has 
once again become politicized, perhaps because writers living in Putin’s 
“managed democracy” feel that they are as remote from the levers of power 
as they were in the Soviet period. 
This paper will focus specifically on fiction and political writings 
published in the late 1990s and early twenty-first century by right-wing 
authors of a “national-patriotic” persuasion. The first part will focus on the 
new rise to prominence in the twenty-first century of certain long-standing 
writers of right-wing political fiction such as Aleksandr Prokhanov (born 
1938), the editor of the ultranationalist newspaper Zavtra (published since 
1993, after his earlier newspaper Den’ was banned); and Eduard Limonov 
(born 1943), the notorious leader of the National Bolshevik Party, which 
since 2007 has been banned as an official party.  
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The second part will analyse a new type of nationalist fiction that 
emerged in the twenty-first century: the imperskii roman (“imperial novel”), 
created by younger writers such as Pavel Krusanov (a member of a group 
called the “New Petersburg Fundamentalists”), and the Moscow writer, 
critic and media personality Dmitrii Bykov, which advocates a strong state 
and imperial expansionism. Works by such nationalist writers attracted a 
wide readership and began to win literary prizes.  
A study of Russian literature from the turn of the twenty-first century is a 
suitable means of exploring the expression and development of 
ultranationalist ideas in post-Soviet Russia  (even though literature has 
become much less influential than in earlier periods of Russian history), 
because it is one medium (along with the Internet) where individual talents 
are able to thrive. Through fiction and socio-political writings in literary 
journals, writers can still express a diversity of views and counter the 
increasingly monolithic government-controlled media. Without revisiting 
the history of Russian nationalist writings in the Soviet and immediate post-
Soviet periods, it is important to note that right-wing ideas did not spring up 
overnight in the 1990s, but had a history dating back – at the very least – to 
Stalin’s embrace of Russian nationalism and his concordat with the official 
Russian Orthodox Church immediately before and during the “Great 
Fatherland War” (Brandenberger 2002). From the “thaw” period onwards, 
an ideological battle has been waged in Russian literature and cultural 
criticism between “liberals” (or “democrats”) and “conservatives” (or 
“national-patriots”) (Marsh 1986, 1995; Ivanova 2007).  
Right-wing literature and publitsistika, which had largely been driven 
underground in the USSR (with the exception of the “village prose” writers 
of the Brezhnev period), re-emerged during glasnost and even began to 
flourish, mainly in the three nationalist journals which survived the fall of 
the Soviet Union and have managed to retain a loyal (if dwindling) 
readership in the twenty-first century. Each of these journals has a different 
profile: generally speaking, Nash sovremennik supports radical Russian 
nationalism, Molodaia gvardiia endorses the communists and the military-
industrial complex, while Moskva propagates Russian religious thought and 
the ideas of the pochvenniki (the native-soil conservatives of the nineteenth 
century). The texts published in these journals are not particularly well 
known in the West, perhaps because cultural studies scholars (including 
myself) have tended to concentrate on the more attractive “liberal,” 
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“democratic,” anti-Stalinist or pro-Western writings that flooded the literary 
journals during perestroika, and the experimental or “post-modernist” 
writings published in the early post-Soviet period.1 Yet by the mid- to late 
1990s, and especially since Yeltsin’s re-election campaign in 1996, followed 
by his ill-fated attempt to discover a new “idea for Russia” in 1996-7, the 
resurgence of Russian nationalism and neo-imperialism and the re-
emergence of traditionalist religion have become too apparent and powerful 
to ignore, and have found reflection in new and diverse forms of literature.  
 
 
 
The Resurgence of Ultranationalist Fiction 
 
 
The ultranationalist writer Aleksandr Prokhanov, who has been publishing 
since 1971, maintains that all his fiction of the post-Soviet period essentially 
forms one book, and that his project of writing seven novels about the fall 
of the “Red Empire” is a sacred mission from God.2  Prokhanov initially 
made his name as a foreign correspondent endorsing Soviet foreign policy, 
notably the war in Afghanistan, but since perestroika he has been a 
consistent supporter of the conservative opposition to both Soviet and post-
Soviet leaders. In August 1991, Prokhanov supported the failed putsch of 
the State Emergency Committee against Gorbachev; he defended the White 
House against Yeltsin’s assault in 1993, and remained an implacable 
opponent of Yeltsin’s regime throughout the 1990s; and he subsequently 
came to oppose Putin (although initially, when he was invited to the 
Kremlin in August 2000, he was prepared to support him, and in the late 
2000s his views appear to be changing again because of Putin’s increasingly 
anti-Western, imperialist policies). Prokhanov has always been a powerful 
and prolific writer with a not inconsiderable artistic talent, but his literary 
career, which was on the wane in the 1990s, experienced a meteoric rise in 
                                                 
1
 One of the few exceptions is Kathleen Parthé (1996; 2004), but she does not deal in 
detail with conservative and nationalist writings of the post-Soviet period. See Ivanova 
(2007) for an overview of right-wing literary criticism since the 1960s, which has 
sometimes, in the twenty-first century, reached shocking neo-fascist proportions.  
2
 Interview with A. Prokhanov, Literaturnaia gazeta, 19-25 June 2002: 7.  
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2002, when he won the National Bestseller Prize for his national-patriotic 
novel Gospodin Geksogen (Mr Hexogen).  
The content of Prokhanov’s novel was sensational and highly topical, 
since it contained biting satires of many of Russia’s leading politicians of 
the past decade, including Yeltsin (recognizable under the soubriquet 
“Istukan” (“The Idol,” or “Dummy”) and Putin (“Izbrannyi,” or “The 
Chosen One”); the main villain is the Jewish oligarch Zaretsky, based on the 
media tycoon Boris Berezovsky who was granted political asylum in 
London in 2003. Mr Hexogen describes the major political events that took 
place in Russia from spring 1999 to the beginning of 2000. Many of the 
episodes depicted by Prokhanov do in fact correspond to the realities of 
Russian political life in this period, although he also includes some fictional 
events (or fascinating political speculations). Prokhanov is rumoured to be 
very well informed, since many readers of Zavtra send him information, and 
he is well connected with the security services.  His novel is distinguished 
by extreme anti-Westernism, rabid anti-Semitism, and Stalinist nostalgia, 
along with a fascination for conspiracy theories and esoteric ideas and 
imagery reminiscent of the New Right theorist of contemporary 
Eurasianism, Aleksandr Dugin.3  In particular, Prokhanov’s depiction of the 
long-standing rivalry between the two esoteric “orders” of the KGB and 
GRU (the military intelligence service) is indebted to Dugin’s neo-fascist 
writings,4 although Dugin dates this conflict back to the immediate 
aftermath of the Bolshevik Revolution, while Prokhanov attributes it to the 
Stalin era (when Russian nationalism was revived to unite the country 
against Nazi Germany).   
At the beginning of the novel, Russia is in disorder after the financial 
crisis of August 1998, and a secret society within the security services (later 
named as “the KGB Order”), decides to take over Russia and establish an 
                                                 
3
 For further discussion of the anti-Western, anti-Semitic aspects of Prokhanov’s novel, 
see Marsh 2007: 523-6, and for a detailed investigation of its esoteric elements, see 
Griffiths 2007. For a heated debate between Andreas Umland and A. James Gregor on 
the question of whether Dugin can be defined as a “fascist,” see Griffin, Loh and 
Umland, 2006: 459-99; and for a translation of Dugin’s work “Fascism – borderless and 
red,” see ibid.: 505-10. Because of this unresolved (or unsolvable?) controversy, I have 
chosen to use the term “neo-fascist” or “ultranationalist” instead of “fascist.”  
4
 Aleksandr Dugin, The Great War of Continents: 7-10, http://www.bolsheviks.org 
/DOCUMENTS/THE%20GREAT%20WAR%20I.htm.  This text was originally 
Right-Wing Writers in Post-Soviet Russia 
 
163 
authoritarian regime. The Order devises “Plan Swahili,” according to which 
“Chosen One” (Putin) who initially appears as “a small man reminiscent of 
a chess piece” (Prokhanov, 2002: 76), will become President of Russia and 
the obedient puppet of the secret “KGB order.” The KGB-FSB, under the 
supervision of General Grechishnikov, probably based on the then Director 
of the FSB Nikolai Patrushev (currently secretary of the Security Council of 
Russia), successfully carries out the plan. Each operation in this scheme 
corresponds to one part of the novel.   
At the beginning of the story, “Chosen One” is the deputy of “Plut” 
(“Tricky”), who was responsible for the luxurious redecoration of Yeltsin’s 
Kremlin (whose prototype is Pavel Borodin, a chief manager in the Kremlin 
administration whom Putin worked for in 1998). In the first part of the 
novel, the “secret debauchee” “Prokurator” (Prosecutor) (Prokhanov, 2002: 
75), Iurii Skuratov, General Prosecutor in the first half of 1999, is gathering 
compromising materials against “Idol”(the old, sick President Yeltsin) in 
accordance with the instructions of the “Bald Mayor” (Iurii Luzhkov, the 
Mayor of Moscow), who wants to become president himself. Prokhanov’s 
fictional protagonist, retired KGB General Belosel’tsev, entices Prosecutor 
to a special flat, where he is seduced by two prostitutes. The entire episode 
is videotaped and shown two days later on a major Moscow television 
channel belonging to the Jewish media magnate Zaretsky (Berezovsky). 
Prosecutor loses his post, changes take place in the FSB and Interior 
Ministry, and Chosen One becomes Director of the FSB. This episode 
corresponds to a real incident that took place at the end of May 1999, when 
General Prosecutor Skuratov was “caught” in bed with two prostitutes and 
the entire episode was shown on a Berezovsky-owned TV channel. As a 
result, Skuratov lost his post and Putin became director of the FSB.  
In the second part of the novel, the FSB, with the assistance of Zaretsky 
and shadowy Chechen agents, provokes a war in Chechnia and Dagestan, 
thus compromising the “plump-cheeked” young “Premier” (Prime Minister) 
(Prokhanov, 2002: 172), who constantly prattles about his officers' honour 
(Sergei Stepashin, Prime Minister in May-August 1999). He loses his 
position and Chosen One becomes Prime Minister. This part of the novel is 
also entirely based on fact: at the beginning of August 1999, after the 
                                                                                                                                     
published as Part III of Konspirologiia (An Analysis of Conspiracies), (Moscow: 
Arktogeia, 1992). 
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Chechen invasion of Dagestan, Prime Minister Stepashin was dismissed and 
Putin took his place. It has also been alleged that Berezovsky played a role 
in the preparations for the Chechen invasion.  
The third part of Prokhanov’s novel concerns the fate of the pro-Western 
politician “Grammofonchik” (“Gramophone”) (Anatolii Sobchak, former 
Mayor of St Petersburg), who was Chosen One’s boss at the beginning of 
the 1990s. Indeed, Putin was Sobchak’s protégé and Deputy Mayor of St 
Petersburg in 1992-3. Prokhanov relates that KGB agents poison a glass of 
Camus cognac that Gramophone is drinking, and he dies. Gramophone’s 
death is necessary to “Plan Swahili” to save “Chosen One” from the 
exposure of incriminating information about him. This is perhaps one part 
of the novel entirely based on speculation: Sobchak did indeed die in 
August 1999, but the official cause of death was a heart attack.   
Part Four (“Operation Hexogen”) is the most sensational part of the 
novel and the most potentially damaging for Putin’s regime. Using a 
hexogen explosive, the “KGB order” organizes a series of explosions in 
blocks of Moscow flats in 1999, but Chechen guerrillas are framed for this 
crime. This provides a pretext for the new prime minister, Chosen One, to 
lead the “war of revenge” in Dagestan and Chechnia. He is soon regarded as 
the people’s hero, which paves his way to the presidential post. In reality, 
whoever was responsible for the bombings of 1999, the FSB and Putin 
undoubtedly used the bomb blasts to start a “patriotic campaign” that 
increased Putin’s prestige, enabling him at the beginning of 2000 to become 
the acting president of Russia.  
The allegations in Prokhanov’s novel that the Russian security services 
were responsible for the 1999 bombings coincide with the accusations made 
by the exiled Berezovsky (although, on the other hand, Berezovsky himself 
is portrayed as the most evil oligarch in the novel). Whether or not these 
allegations are true, Putin and the FSB are clearly very sensitive about them 
and have tried to prevent them from being disseminated any further in 
Russia. In March-May 2002, the Russian  customs confiscated many 
videotapes of “The Assassination of Russia,” a film produced by 
Berezovsky (screened in London in March 2002), which depicts the FSB’s 
role in the Moscow and Volgodonsk bombings, as well as the failed attempt 
to produce a similar explosion in Riazan in September 1999. In addition, the 
FSB and Russian Interior Ministry energetically searched for further copies 
of the film that had been smuggled into the country.  
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At the end of Prokhanov’s novel the FSB gains supreme power and 
initiates the redistribution of property in its own interests. In particular, the 
media magnates Zaretsky and Astros, who are depicted as “Russophobic” 
members of a world-wide Jewish conspiracy, lose their empires (as actually 
happened to Berezovsky and Gusinsky). The implication is, however, that 
the position of the Russian people becomes no better under the new 
repressive regime.  
Two commentators writing in the West, Aleksandr Nemets and Thomas 
Torda, who generally accept Berezovsky’s and Prokhanov’s version of 
events, have suggested that “millions of Russians” do indeed trust the facts 
given in Prokhanov’s novel and consider the FSB and Putin the main 
“heroes” behind the Moscow bombings (Putin himself has been called “Mr. 
Hexogen”).5 They also emphasize, with some astonishment, that despite all 
this information, Putin remained extremely popular in Russia in the early 
2000s, when up to 75 per cent of Russians still supported him (although 
according to some sources based on “closed polls,” the level of support was 
actually much less). With considerable apprehension, they point out that a 
similar situation existed in Germany in 1936-8, when Hitler, like Putin, was 
popular both at home and in Western Europe. They also claim that direct 
struggle against the “Chosen One” (“Mr. Hexogen”) and the security 
services has become almost impossible under Putin’s administration, which 
is controlled by the FSB. In June 2002, for example, the Russian Duma 
adopted a “law against extremism” which can easily be used not only 
against convicted Chechen terrorists, but also against any individual or 
organization hostile to the existing regime.   
In mid-May 2002, the Russian General Prosecutor’s office announced 
that it had found no clues connecting the FSB with the explosions in the 
blocks of flats. This claim was made in a special letter from Deputy General 
Prosecutor Vasily Kolmogorov (the Kremlin candidate in the Sakha-Yakutia 
Republic’s presidential election in December 2001) to Duma member Sergei 
Iushenkov, Berezovsky’s main representative in Russia. This is hardly 
surprising, since the General Prosecutor Vladimir Ustinov, his deputy Vasily 
Kolmogorov, and their associates clearly had no wish to suffer the fate of 
former General Prosecutor Iurii Skuratov (described so vividly in the 
                                                 
5
 Aleksandr Nemets and Thomas Torda, “Gospodin Geksogen,” NewsMax.com, 19 July 
2002, www.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2002/7/18/213136.shml 
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novel). The failure to make any arrests for these explosions, and the 
subsequent fate of some of Putin’s major opponents, including the shocking 
murder of the investigative journalist Anna Politkovskaia in October 2006, 
do indeed suggest either that Putin’s regime has  much to hide, or that the 
government is unable to control the FSB and its allies in Chechnia.  
Prokhanov’s novel was published on the Zavtra website and printed in 
several hundred thousand copies by the intellectual publishing house “Ad 
Marginem,” thus allowing far more Russians access to this text than is usual 
with Russian literary works outside the genres of “mass literature.” Many 
Russian readers, including those who did not normally choose to read 
“national-patriotic” literature, were therefore able to familiarize themselves 
with extremist right-wing views. Liberal intellectuals were particularly 
shocked that a serious, usually liberal publishing house like “Ad Marginem” 
had chosen to publish Prokhanov’s peculiar mixture of Stalinism, Russian 
Orthodoxy, and neo-fascism,6 and some were shocked by Prokhanov’s 
decision to donate the money he won from the National Bestseller Prize to 
the campaign fund of the imprisoned National Bolshevik writer Eduard 
Limonov (which demonstrates a certain solidarity among right-wing 
intellectuals belonging to different political factions, but united in their 
hostility to Putin).    
Prokhanov’s star certainly seems to have risen in the twenty-first century. 
His enormously long novels, which few Russians used to read, have now 
become very fashionable, and Prokhanov has been lionized in high society. 
His earlier novels, which attracted little attention at the time of publication, 
have been published in revised editions, notably Poslednii soldat imperii 
(Last Soldier of the Empire, first published in 1993; revised in 2003), a 
novel which laments the end of the Soviet empire and the collapse of the 
Soviet state, displaying extreme anti-Western (especially anti-American) 
sentiments. Prokhanov supports the State Emergency Committee’s attempt 
to topple Gorbachev, and regards post-Soviet Moscow with its foreign-
owned supermarkets and advertising hoardings in English, as a city under 
occupation. Similarly, his 1999 novel Krasno-korichnevyi (literally Red-
Brown, but other possible translations are “Communist-Fascist,” or 
                                                 
6
 On the attitudes of liberal intellectuals to Prokhanov’s novel and its publishing house, 
see Sergei Chuprinin, “Posle draki. Urok prikladnoi konspirologii,” Znamia, 2002, No. 
10: 192-7.  
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“Communist-Nazi”), which presents a graphic depiction of Yeltsin’s attack 
on the White House in 1993, has also been republished in 2003. Prokhanov 
suggests that the only hope of combating globalization and the 
Westernization of post-Soviet Russia is a “red-brown” patriotism based on 
the sovereignty of the state and a “Russian Empire” that transcends the 
narrower notion of Russia as an ethnic state “for the Russians” alone. In his 
later novel Politolog (The Political Scientist, 2005), his hero Strizhailo 
issues a chilling threat to the West:  
 
Below, hidden by clouds, Europe was relaxing after the end of the “Cold War,” 
naively imagining that Russia had ceased for ever to be an empire, and that 
Russian tanks would now never reach the Elbe and the Oder. Strizhailo gulped his 
whisky and allowed himself a refined smile at the mistake the sybaritic continent 
was making (Prokhanov, 2005: 188).  
 
 It is a striking sign of the times that Prokhanov, the erstwhile spokesman of 
the Soviet military whose nationalist and imperialist views became deeply 
unfashionable during perestroika and the early 1990s, has found in the 
authoritarian Putin era that Russian politics and society are once again 
moving in his direction.   
Another artistically talented writer with extremist political views is 
Eduard Limonov, whose first and best novel Eto ia, Edichka (It’s Me, 
Eddie, 1979), a sexually frank exposé of the life of a Russian émigré on 
welfare in New York, achieved a succès de scandale in the West, and 
became a bestseller when it was eventually published in Russia in 1991.7  
Whereas Limonov was then seen as a left-wing writer with Trotskyite 
sympathies, his political career since returning to Russia from France in 
1991 has been more associated with the right: he had been an ally of  both 
Zhirinovsky and Dugin, but broke with both. With Dugin, he had 
established the National Bolshevik Party in 1994 from which Dugin 
departed in 1998. Although Limonov’s provocative, sexually explicit 
writings have always appealed to a disgruntled audience of rebellious youth, 
his political views have reached a wider audience in the twenty-first 
century, especially after his prison term in 2001-3 on charges including the 
unlawful procurement of weapons, terrorism, and the formation of an illegal 
                                                 
7
 For Limonov’s earlier biography and writings, see Rogachevskii 2003; for more recent 
developments, see Meier 2008.   
168 Rosalind Marsh 
 
armed unit to invade Kazakhstan. Any popularity that Limonov enjoys may 
be due to the fact that, as is rumoured, he is often prepared to express 
explicitly what other Russians are only thinking. 
His autobiographical Kniga vody (Book of Water, 2002), written in 
prison, became a bestseller, and, along with most of Limonov’s recent 
writings, is available in Russian on the Internet. His manifesto Drugaia 
Rossiia: Ochertaniia budushchego (The Other Russia: Outlines of the 
Future, 2003), published on his release from prison, is permeated with 
ultranationalism, xenophobia, and misogynistic views. He refers to his two 
passions as “war and women”, and expresses a neo-fascist aspiration 
towards the rebirth of a new state, with “new people”, making such 
extraordinary statements as:  
 
It will be necessary for new people to have children. Many children will be 
essential for the country to grow rapidly. It will therefore be necessary to permit 
many types of family: those that will lead to unprecedented multiplication. 
Polygamy and free communities should be allowed. Women should be 
permanently pregnant and bearing children (Limonov 2003). 
 
I am not suggesting that many Russian politicians or intellectuals take 
Limonov’s views seriously, but the fact that they are not unique in 
contemporary Russia is demonstrated by the fact that in 2000, Zhirinovsky 
attempted to introduce a law on polygamy into the Duma. It is, moreover, 
unfortunate that because there is no opportunity for Limonov and his 
supporters to organize legally, he has joined the opposition movement 
“Drugaia Rossiia” (“The Other Russia”), along with the genuinely liberal 
former chess champion Garry Kasparov, and a serious politician, the former 
Prime Minister Mikhail Kas’ianov. Although Limonov is at least consistent 
in his opposition to the current Russian government, and has been detained 
several times during demonstrations in 2008-9, his participation has 
sometimes been used as a pretext to discredit the whole movement.  
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“The imperial novel” 
 
The term “imperskost’” (which should be translated as “imperiality”, or “an 
imperial mentality” rather than “imperialism”) has become widely used in 
Russian society and the media since the 1990s, although its meaning varies 
and is often far from clear. It has been predominantly used as a slogan by 
the “patriotic opposition” to express their nostalgia for the Soviet Union 
(Boym 2001; Ivanova 2003), and their hostility to what they perceive as the 
relentless spread of globalization and Western cultural imperialism. Notions 
of imperskost’ have also been invoked to counter Yeltsin’s view that not 
only formerly colonized nations but Russia too had been a victim of the 
Soviet Empire, and to oppose attempts by post-Soviet leaders to create a 
new Russian civic consciousness, rather than one based on traditional 
concepts of national greatness associated with imperial values and the 
Russian Orthodox Church.  
This section of the paper will explore some of the new literature 
expressing “neo-imperialist” views by two new, younger writers that 
emerged at the end of the 1990s. Since the collapse of the Soviet Empire,8 
the literary genre that tends to be used to explore such ideas is the fantasy 
novel – either the “historical fantasy” presenting an alternative view of 
Russian or Soviet history, or the fantasy set in the future, whether utopian or 
dystopian.  
One particularly striking example of this genre was Pavel Krusanov’s 
Ukus angela (The Bite of an Angel, 1999), which won the prize sponsored 
by the journal Oktiabr’.9 Krusanov (born 1961) had begun writing during 
perestroika, but not been noticed at that time, like many of his young 
contemporaries. By the late 1990s, however, he had managed to adapt to the 
current literary and political situation by combining fashionable fantastic 
and esoteric themes with imperialist ambitions, probably under the direct or 
indirect influence of the right-wing thinkers Aleksandr Sekatsky and 
Aleksandr Dugin.  
                                                 
8
 Although Hosking and others have argued that Russia’s nationhood has been associated 
with empire since Ivan IV’s conquest of Kazan in the 1550s, it is a contested issue 
whether either “nation-state” or “empire” is an appropriate definition of the multi-ethnic 
Russian Federation.  
9
 Krusanov’s novel, along with other “imperial novels,” was subsequently published by 
the Petersburg publishing house “Amfora” (2000).  
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Bite of an Angel describes an alternative world in which, at the end of the 
twentieth century, Russia, instead of shrinking to its smallest size for about 
200 years,  has extended its empire to China and the Balkans, and is waging 
a world war to annex more territories. The novel depicts the rise to supreme 
power of the dictator Ivan Nekitaev (whose name literally means “not-
Chinese”), who is presented as an Antichrist figure, with demonic powers. 
Nekitaev stops at nothing in his ruthless pursuit of dictatorial power: he has 
sex with his sister, throws an inconvenient mistress from an aeroplane, and 
kills all his closest associates, one by one, in the most brutal manner. At the 
end of the novel, when he begins losing the war he has started, he unleashes 
his “Hounds of Hecate” to hasten the Apocalypse.  
Bite of an Angel is quite accomplished stylistically and has been 
compared to “magical realism” and the work of the fashionable Serbian 
writer Milosz Pavić. However, the most important reason for its popularity 
was that it plays on the post-imperialist nostalgia of a failed superpower. As 
the perceptive Russian critic Vsevolod Brodsky has commented,  
Bite plays on the subconscious hopes and fears of the post-Soviet reader, 
oppressed by the transformation of his country from a world superpower to 
a slightly embarrassing European country with poor municipal services.10  
Not surprisingly, Krusanov’s novel attained wide popularity and 
considerable praise from Russian nationalist critics (Kniazev, n.d.). What 
Russian critics have not acknowledged, however – perhaps because it is so 
common in Russian discourse – is that Krusanov’s novel is also an 
extremely misogynistic text: women are simply sexual objects and breeding 
animals in Nekitaev’s new Empire.  
It is not clear from the text whether Krusanov supports the merciless 
Nekitaev or not, although he is obviously fascinated by this powerful leader 
for whom, in Dostoevsky’s terms, “everything is permissible.” In an 
interview of 2001, however, Krusanov clarified his views (perhaps to insure 
against criticism?), claiming that his novel was intended to be interpreted as 
an “instruction” or warning that empires should be limited: “an Empire 
should not incarnate the idea of universality, it should have frontiers, and, if 
not an enemy, then at least a rival on those frontiers. After destroying its 
                                                 
10
 Vsevolod Brodsky, “Letter from Russia,” transl. Keith Gessen, Context, No. 9,  Online 
Edition, www.centerforbookculture.org/context/no9/brodsky.htm 
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final rival, an Empire will destroy itself too.”11 Since, as he points out, no 
empire has actually gone as far as this in reality, his “artistic experiment” 
has proved all the more interesting.  
Krusanov does, however, acknowledge that he, like the majority of his 
fellow countrymen, has an “imperial consciousness” because he was born in 
an empire, “even if not the most attractive in the world.” Nevertheless, he 
claims to have no desire for the return of an empire of either the Soviet or 
the tsarist type, which, as he correctly notes, is “currently romanticized” in 
Russia. He yearns instead for a mystical empire:  “an order of the 
spirit…which longs for some ideal form, longs for the Heavenly Empire, 
which still only awaits its creator.” At the same time the “bearer of spirit, of 
course, realizes that the Heavenly Empire, like every transcendental object, 
is most likely unattainable.” Krusanov admits that he is an “imperialist” 
(imperets) in the mould of the conservative nineteenth-century thinker 
Konstantin Leont’ev, “because in the first instance I am attracted not by 
order, power or an 'iron hand,' but by the aesthetics of Empire.” However, 
he does acknowledge that “to a certain extent these things are interrelated.”  
Yet although he may not advocate an apocalyptic world war to expand 
the Russian empire, Krusanov has certainly ventured beyond the “aesthetics 
of empire” (whatever this means), and shown himself to be a passionate 
advocate of imperialist political views who, along with his colleagues in the 
“Ob’’edinennoe peterburgskoe mogushchestvo” (“United Petersburg 
Power”) signed a petition in 2001 deploring the “enormous territorial losses 
of Russia at the end of the twentieth century.” They urged Putin to “defend 
the invisible borders” of the Russian Federation, which allegedly exist in the 
“imperial self-consciousness” of the Russian people, and explicitly named 
these borders as “Tsargrad, the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles.”12 
“Tsargrad” is the old Slavonic name for Constantinople, the lost city which 
the Russian Tsars allegedly wished to recapture, but which was no longer 
used in Russian after this distant goal was abandoned. By reviving this 
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archaic term, the “new Petersburg fundamentalists” clearly want to restore 
the pre-revolutionary imperial consciousness, but it is not clear if they 
believe this objective should exist only in the mind, or whether these writers 
actually expect Putin to expand the frontiers of the Russian Federation.   
This petition, in turn, was just part of the “Invisible Empire” project 
which he and his fellow writers grouped round the Petersburg “Amfora” 
publishing house had announced in April 2001. They initially proclaimed an 
artistic manifesto entitled “Zaiavlenie dlia publichnogo oglasheniia” 
(“Statement for Public Proclamation”) and launched a new book series of 
“public intellectual prose” which has proved to be quite successful. The 
liberal critic Dmitry Golynko-Volfson has perceptively summarized the 
disturbing views of the “Petersburg fundamentalists:” 
 
Russia has of course been reduced from a superpower to an economically broken-
down colony of globalized capitalism, and the fundamentalists believe it will have 
to redeem itself through a new messianic ideal, balancing between mystical 
fascism and Orthodox sanctity.13 
 
Another influential writer of nationalist and imperialist novels who has 
become much more prominent in the twenty-first century is the outspoken 
and provocative Moscow-based poet, critic and television presenter Dmitrii 
Bykov (born 1967), whose fiction falls into the category of “historical 
fantasies” that envisage an alternative past for the Soviet empire.  
Bykov’s first novel Opravdanie (which can be translated as Justification, 
or The Acquittal, 2001)14 presents a fantastic version of the motives for 
Stalin’s purges, showing that new writers of the younger generation, 
particularly those with right-wing sympathies, were by the twenty-first 
century prepared to adopt a completely new (and to many, shocking) 
approach to sensitive historical topics which for older generations were part 
of horrific lived experience. Bykov’s protagonist, the young historian Slava 
Rogov, is obsessed by the fate of his grandfather Ivan Skaldina, a brilliant 
professor at the Timiriazev Agricultural Academy who was arrested in 1938 
and had apparently disappeared in Stalin’s camps, although his mother 
thinks she heard his voice on the phone many years later. Rogov seeks to 
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discover the meaning of Stalin’s repressions: in particular, he wonders why 
it was necessary to destroy the most talented military men on the eve of an 
inevitable war, and to kill the country’s best scientists and writers. He learns 
from his neighbour Kretov, an elderly ex-prisoner, the startling information 
that Stalin’s purges and camps acted as a “great filter:” those who behaved 
most bravely under torture, giving no false testimony either against 
themselves or others, were not shot but sent to special Siberian settlements 
where they were forged into a new Soviet elite, or “a golden company” 
(Bykov, 2005: 63). It was these strong personalities who were called upon 
to defend the Fatherland in its moments of crisis, such as the Battles of 
Moscow and Stalingrad. In the post-war period some of the survivors 
return, including the great Jewish writer Isaac Babel (who was actually shot 
in 1940).  
To Kretov, the use of mass terror to discover a mere handful of worthy 
individuals seems to justify Stalin’s policy:  
 
How was he [Stalin] to test the population? Hitler was torturing his own people 
everywhere in Germany, the strongest communists were being broken, war was 
inevitable – how can you tell who will be able to withstand that machine? And so 
he selected – cruelly, of course, but, if you think about it, his method wasn’t the 
worst. No, not the worst.  
 
Kretov also argues that Stalin believed that the majority of Soviet people 
were so “rotten” that they deserved no better fate than the camps, and 
advances a Nietzschean explanation of Stalin’s policy: “He understood that 
it was impossible to build a super-state with a normal people, with the 
previous specialists. A super-state must be built by supermen” (Bykov, 
2005: 65-6).  
Although Rogov does not initially take this hypothesis seriously, he 
eventually comes to feel that there is a “rational core” to it. Putting himself 
in the position of Stalin’s torturers, he conjectures:  
 
When a marshal broke before their eyes, a recent arbiter of fates was crawling 
over the cement floor, or a favourite party feuilletonist betrayed his wife and 
children – even the most obtuse interrogator could not fail to experience, besides 
the usual plebeian vindictiveness, satisfaction of a higher order – the fulfilment of 
some kind of higher justice. If such rotten people had taught them all how to live 
or had stood at the head of the army – they had got their just deserts! 
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It was this “nonsensical dialogue” that particularly incensed liberal critics, 
especially the labelling of millions of completely innocent victims of 
Stalinism as “rotten people” (“gnil’”, “gnilye”).15 It is difficult to decide 
whether this, and other similar statements, should be interpreted as Bykov’s 
attempt to provide an accurate depiction of the psychology of Stalin’s 
torturers (a fashionable theme in the late and post-Soviet periods), or as a 
deliberate attempt to be provocative and offensive to his elders, particularly 
liberal intellectuals of the 1960s generation.    
At the end of the novel Bykov’s protagonist Rogov is himself subjected 
to violence (albeit only in a fantastic manner), and he comes to the 
conclusion that:  
 
The meaning of life was not the destruction of other people, not the seizure of 
other people’s land, not the pitiful, essentially animal battle for existence – it was 
to inflict and survive pain, pointless and useless, now demeaning, now elevating 
the soul. Pain was regarded as of paramount importance – not the dull pain of a 
beaten animal, but the lofty metaphysics of punishment, in the face of which all 
are equal; the pain of exquisite martyrdom, pain as catharsis, pain as relief! 
(Bykov, 2005: 248).  
 
Although we have to remember that Rogov is finally revealed to be 
mentally ill, this sadomasochistic justification of pain in the service of the 
Stalinist empire offers a challenge to all those who advance a liberal, 
humanistic interpretation of Stalin’s crimes. It also provides a new 
permutation on the idea of resistance to Stalin, and on the age-old Russian 
propensity to praise suffering and martyrdom. Rogov constantly reflects on 
the question of “the mechanisms of selection in a time of repression,” 
basing his views on his own experience of bullying in the army. He 
develops a whole theory about the use of force:  
 
Chance and unpredictable motives began to appear to him as the main sign of 
Divine will. It was impossible to respect will power directed by ordinary human 
rules…There is only force – and this force is strong up to the point when its 
motive is clear and its actions are unpredictable (Bykov, 2005: 59-60).  
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He has similar respect for an empire based on force:  
 
This was why the empire was an empire – with all its greatness, with its victory 
over nature…because it abolished good and evil, dividing everyone into consistent 
executioners and consistent victims, and this was its incomparable, nostalgically 
lovable integrity.(Bykov, 2005: 45).  
 
Bykov’s own views were expressed in an illuminating interview with Igor’ 
Shevelev in 2001, when he was asked if his novel intended to expose or 
eulogize the “imperial myth:”  
 
Yes, unfortunately, in the process of writing it became clear that imperial 
structures were more convincing than their opposite. The Stalinist empire is 
presented in the novel as much more seductive than contemporary life, from 
which the main hero seeks to escape. Perhaps that’s a good thing. The critic 
Ageev is right: Bykov is above all attracted by force. I’m afraid that’s true….The 
fact is that in itself martyrdom is aesthetically more attractive than any purpose for 
which it is supposedly undergone….The idea of Justification: that repressions had 
the aim of forming a new type of person – does not seem so very subversive to 
me. And even productive, from a literary point of view.16 
 
Bykov’s bold and sensational subject matter caused heated debate in 
Russian intellectual circles. To some critics and readers who had lived 
through the Stalin era, the very decision to treat this sensitive historical 
topic in such a fantastic and provocative manner was in extremely poor 
taste, to say the least. Some found the depiction of Babel as “an obsequious 
toady to Stalin” particularly repellent.17 Others complained about the 
discussion of this issue in flat, journalistic language rather than with the 
stylistic flair of a “new Platonov.”18 Others, however, defended the author’s 
right to handle this subject in any way he chose. Elena Shubina, an editor 
for Vagrius, the publishing house which produced Bykov’s novel, argued 
that she was interested in seeing how the new “generation of thirty-year-
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olds” would approach the theme of Stalin’s terror, and simply stated: “I like 
the way Dima writes.”19   
Despite serious criticism from liberals and anti-Stalinists, Bykov’s novel 
received recognition from both critics and readers by winning the Vagrius 
publishing house’s “First Novel” prize, as well as being shortlisted for both 
the “National Bestseller prize” and the Strugatsky brothers’ prize for fantasy 
literature. Opravdanie represents a particularly graphic expression of the 
changing climate of opinion in contemporary Russia, with its display of 
imperial nostalgia and love of power. This interpretation is borne out by the 
frank comments Bykov made in the interview with Shevelev when he 
admitted that he had written the novel to struggle against his own “imperial 
complex:” “This is not necessarily a Soviet imperial complex, but some 
general totalitarianism of tastes which is very characteristic of me.” He also 
acknowledges his sympathy for the Nietzchean concept of the Superman: 
 
A human being is the effort of being a human being…a human being is what 
needs to be overcome…All of us who are interesting to one another are solely 
concerned with squeezing the human being out of ourselves, our biological 
cowardice and limited nature.  
 
In the conclusion of the novel, it is revealed that Rogov was mentally ill, 
and that the hypothesis about the formation of the Stalinist elite was nothing 
but a product of his diseased brain; he finally dies in a Siberian bog because 
he has succumbed to the temptation of evil.  However, this sudden 
transformation is far less convincing than the praise of force – and even of 
violence and torture – in the body of the novel. It is difficult to escape the 
conclusion that Bykov simply tacked on the ending to make it more likely to 
achieve publication and not to inflict too great a shock on liberal, humanist 
opinion.  
Bykov’s Justification demonstrates the tendency of certain writers of the 
younger generation who did not experience the Stalin era to attempt not 
merely to explain Stalinism, but to justify it, expressing regret for the end of 
the Soviet empire, and adopting a neo-fascist admiration for naked force 
and strong personalities. Bykov’s novel, although perhaps partly influenced 
by Solzhenitsyn, who in The Gulag Archipelago had expressed admiration 
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for those brave few who had stood up to their Stalinist interrogators, and by 
other works of the late 1980s that had emphasized resistance to the Stalinist 
regime, affords a total contradiction to the testimony of GULag survivors 
themselves and to the liberal, humanist views of “people of the 1960s 
generation” whose views were predominant during glasnost (Marsh 1996). 
Was Bykov simply looking for a new, shocking approach to the subject of 
Stalinism; or is he, like other writers and intellectuals of his generation, prey 
to the temptation of neo-fascism as a response to the end of empire? It 
could, of course, be argued that it is Bykov’s protagonist Rogov, not the 
author himself, who expresses sympathy for such views, but Rogov is 
clearly intended to be the author’s alter ego, as his name suggests: Rogov 
comes from “rog” (a horn) while Bykov is derived from the word “byk” (a 
bull). Bykov, as he has admitted in interviews, clearly despises weakness, 
and he appears to sympathize with those interrogators who regarded those 
who were broken and begged for mercy as gnil’ (“rotten people”). He fails 
to point out that the millions denigrated by such labels were totally innocent 
people, appearing to regard the infliction of pain in the service of the state 
as justified, and suggesting that terror may lead to the acquisition of 
enlightenment. His novel presents a complete contrast to the restrained 
depiction of the prison camp in Solzhenitsyn’s One Day in the Life of Ivan 
Denisovich, or to the justified anger in works by former prisoners, such as 
Varlam Shalamov’s Kolyma Tales, and the many memoirs by camp 
survivors who have told the truth about their own sufferings in the GULag.   
It is possible that Bykov’s novel would have been acceptable to some 
critics in a collection of works of science fiction and fantasy, but they found 
it difficult to accept its publication in such a respected “thick journal” as 
Novyi mir – and, subsequently, in the prestigious publishing house 
“Vagrius.” Bykov’s novel cannot be regarded as totally original, since it 
follows the genre of “alternative history” in the vein of magical realism 
established by Vladimir Sharov in the 1990s, and the depiction of a 
resurrected Babel is reminiscent of the clones of writers portrayed in 
Sorokin’s Goluboe salo (Blue Lard, 1999). However, Bykov’s Opravdanie 
presents a significant, though highly disturbing, departure from earlier 
interpretations of Stalinism in both Russian and Western literature.  
Bykov does, of course, have a perfect right to write such “quasi-
historical” novels, but his new and provocative approach to Stalinism 
clearly reflects the challenging right-wing views that were becoming more 
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prevalent in mainstream publications in the twenty-first century. Although 
older, more liberal writers and critics were still prepared to counter such 
ultranationalist views, arguing that there can be no justification – even a 
fantastic one – for Stalin’s crimes, one wonders whether future generations 
of Russians will even come into contact with such anti-Stalinist views now 
that Solzhenitsyn has died and other camp survivors of his generation are 
growing old.   
Another interesting “imperial novel” set in an earlier historical period is 
Bykov’s second novel Orfografiia (Orthography, first published in 2003), 
which the author subtitled an “opera in three acts.” In the “Afterword” to 
the novel he also explains that he wanted “to revive the traditions of the 
native epic” in Russian literature (Bykov 2004: 686).20 His novel, moreover, 
fits into the genre of the roman à clef, since it includes both real historical 
characters under their own names, such as Gorky,  and others with 
pseudonyms whose prototypes are easily recognizable, such as the writers  
Maiakovsky (Korabel’nikov), Khlebnikov (Melnikov) and Khodasevich 
(who is called Kazarin, the name of the egoist and hypocrite in Lermontov’s 
play “Masquerade”). While some sympathetic critics have even called 
Orthography “Russia’s answer to The Magic Mountain,” or “the nearest 
thing to a great post-Soviet novel,” others have strongly objected to its 
central theme.  
Bykov’s novel starts from a real event – the Bolsheviks’ orthographic 
reform of 1918 – but imagines that instead of reform, they have the 
revolutionary notion of abolishing Russian orthography altogether, since 
they regard the old Russian spelling as one aspect of the tsarist regime’s 
world-view which hinders the understanding of the uneducated peasantry 
and working class. The novel relates how in 1918 a number of linguists and 
writers are sent by Commissar Charnolusky (an obvious reference to 
Lunacharsky, the Commissar for Education and Enlightenment) to a 
commune on Elagin Island in Petrograd with the assignment of reinventing 
the Russian alphabet. At the same time, however, another group of young 
avant-garde writers forms its own, rival commune. The protagonist of the 
novel, a budding newspaper reporter writing under the pseudonym Yat’ (the 
name of a pre-revolutionary letter that was eliminated by the reform and 
replaced by “e”), is intended to symbolize the old intelligentsia. Yat’ is torn 
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between the two camps, finding many different arguments persuasive but 
feeling unable to support any of them whole-heartedly.  He is eventually 
dismissed from his job when his newspaper is closed down for being 
“counter-revolutionary.” Bykov suggests that Yat’ is cast off from society 
like the letters of the old alphabet, yet oppressed by the new order which 
seizes his home to accommodate proletarian families. Since he and his 
fellow intellectuals can do nothing but disrupt the development of the new 
regime, he finally feels obliged to leave his beloved Crimea and emigrate 
from the USSR. The most interesting and effective aspects of the novel are 
those devoted to debates between the intellectuals of the immediate post-
revolutionary period, and the evocation of Yat’s exile from his homeland.  
Bykov claims in his “Afterword” that the only invented element in the 
novel is the initial plotline – the reinvention of Russian orthography. Yet 
although the post-revolutionary literary milieu is skilfully evoked, Bykov’s 
aim in writing Orfografiia was more ambitious than simply the realistic 
depiction of a specific historical period: as the liberal critic Lev Danilkin 
suggested, it was motivated by “a tremendous will to transform not only the 
literary but primarily the social landscape.”21  The novel is a metaphor for 
revolution, for political and cultural upheaval, which raises the fundamental 
questions: where did the Russian state go wrong in the twentieth century? 
What was the role of the Russian intelligentsia in this process? What caused 
the historical degradation of the Russian empire? The novel suggests that 
many members of the post-revolutionary intelligentsia felt that the new 
regime’s methods of achieving its goals were too crude, but the different 
factions were unable to work together for the good of their country, wasting 
their time instead in furious disputes with each other.   
The author draws parallels between the immediate post-revolutionary 
period, which witnessed the closure of the liberal newspaper Rech’ in 1917 
and Gorky’s Left Socialist Revolutionary paper Novaia zhizn’ in 1918, and 
the turmoil of the Putin era, notably the conflict surrounding the closure of 
the NTV television station in 2001 which dealt a serious blow to freedom of 
speech and the hopes of the liberal intelligentsia. Bykov’s depiction of the 
early Soviet intellectuals’ inability to live under one roof and their 
involvement in constant conflicts and schisms also reflects the bitter and 
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continuing conflict between the “democrats” and “patriots” in post-Soviet 
Russia. The contemporary parallels are enhanced because, according to 
Russian commentators, Yat’s appearance is reminiscent of that of the well-
known film critic Andrei Shemiakin, while his character resembles that of 
Viktor Shenderovich (director of “Kukly” (“Dolls”), the Russian version of 
the satirical television series “Spitting Image,” which aroused the hostility 
of both Yeltsin and Putin and was taken off the air in 2002.22  
Bykov is not sympathetic to the liberal intellectuals of either period, 
suggesting that they fuss and panic impotently, while the power of the post-
revolutionary state aims to simplify the lives of ordinary people.  In his 
“Afterword,” Bykov clarifies the resemblance between the two 
revolutionary periods:  
 
No one who has lived in Russia in the 1990s can fail to know the Russian 
revolution: there are certain things that are typologically inherent in all pre- and 
post-revolutionary periods. On the eve of the coup you feel ecstasy and tension, a 
creative upsurge and an incomparable sense of belonging to the destiny of the 
world; after the coup comes the turn of disillusionment and boredom.  
 
Every revolution, in Bykov’s view, also leads to a schism among the 
intelligentsia between those prepared to cooperate with the new regime and 
those who rebel against it:  
 
 A part of the unhappy class, piously believing in the need for change, or dreaming 
of running  ahead of the steam engine, rushes to collaborate with the hegemons; 
the other takes up conservative and defensive positions, has a sceptical attitude to 
the prospect of revolutionary transformations and as a result, always turns out to 
be right (Bykov, 2004: 684). 
 
Here Bykov is clearly articulating his own, conservative critique of the 
“new Russian revolution” of 1991.     
In an interview with Vladimir Itkin, Bykov reiterated his sympathy for 
the stability of the Russian and Soviet empires and his hostility toward 
revolutions. He argued in his usual idiosyncratic and provocative manner 
that while no direct analogy can be drawn between the two periods, there 
are certain major similarities between the years 1917-18 and the period after 
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1985, the year of  the accession of Gorbachev, whom he condemns for 
having destroyed the Soviet empire: 
 
In the first place, we are living after the usual simplification…in 1917 and 1985 
underground forces of a similarly dark nature spilled out. These were forces of 
simplification, primitive forces, and the rejection of self-discipline. In this sense 
the consequences were the same: the collapse of everything complex, subtle and 
intelligent, all the reality of a “secondary order” (that is, non-pragmatic, not 
possessing a crude material nature). Secondly, in contemporary Russia there is no 
political force that it would not be shameful to join and which it would not be 
shameful to sympathize with. All are equally bad. As in the conflict between 
America and Iraq. 
 
In Bykov’s opinion, the Russian Revolution’s aim was to take life back to 
first principles, reducing the range and diversity of the old, sophisticated 
tsarist era by proclamations aspiring to simplify everything: literature, 
morality, orthography, everyday life, and food rations. He suggests that 
simplification then led to the destruction first of “unnecessary” letters like 
yat, then of culture in general, and eventually, of human beings too. 
However, in 1918 (and by implication, in 1985 and 1991), few realized how 
far this process of destruction would lead. He goes on to explain: “it is not 
for nothing that every revolution begins by simplifying the orthography and 
ends by removing the taboo on bloodletting.”23  
 
 
 
Conclusion  
 
 
Although this paper has concentrated on “serious” literature, or, at least, 
literature that possesses some artistic pretensions, I could also have used 
many examples of “popular literature” to illustrate the resurgence of 
nationalist and neo-imperialist ideas in contemporary Russian society, 
especially hard-boiled thrillers, popular historical novels, and the new genre 
of “Slavonic fantasy” (Lovell and Menzel, 2005; Borenstein, 2007). The 
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expression of Russian nationalism is even more evident in film and 
television programmes, which require government funding (Condee 2009a; 
2009b; Liderman 2007); while racism, anti-Semitism and xenophobia reach 
more extreme proportions in literary criticism (Ivanova 2007), and media 
discourse, particularly Prokhanov’s newspaper Zavtra.   
This paper has focused on some of the more extreme manifestations of 
Russian nationalism in recent literature, but, of course, a range of 
conservative or patriotic views has been expressed in contemporary Russian 
fiction. Many literary texts published in the post-Soviet period convey a 
rather more moderate and widely acceptable form of Russian patriotism 
based on nostalgia for the lost tsarist state and empire, notably the popular 
“retro-detective” series by Boris Akunin set at the end of the nineteenth 
century, which feature the gentleman detective Erast Fandorin and the nun 
Pelageia. On the whole, women writers are not as openly nationalistic or 
racist as some male authors, but one counter-example is the controversial 
Elena Chudinova, with her anti-Islamic dystopia Mechet’ parizhskoi 
bogomateri. 2048 god (The Mosque of Notre Dame de Paris, 2048, 2005).24  
Although the “imperskii roman” and “new political novel” that emerged 
in the twenty-first century cannot exactly be seen as a new literature of 
“social command” similar to Soviet socialist realism, the ideas of right-wing 
writers about the desirability of a great Russian state certainly reflect the 
changing political climate of the early twenty-first century. Such texts have 
helped to create and uphold the values of russkost’ (“Russianness”) and 
gosudarstvennost’ (“state power”) that have underpinned the policies of 
Putin and the Putin-Medvedev diarchy since 2000.   
If, in the early 1990s, some of the liberal cultural elite had advocated a 
postmodernist literature largely divorced from any historical and political 
context, and the only writers of political novels were such long-standing 
mavericks as the neo-Stalinist and extreme nationalist Aleksandr Prokhanov 
and the National Bolshevik leader Eduard Limonov, the late 1990s 
witnessed the emergence of a number of younger writers of “imperial 
novels” such as Bykov and Krusanov, who attracted a wide readership and 
began to win literary prizes. In the twenty-first century too, new works by 
Putin’s right-wing critics Prokhanov and Limonov have attracted more 
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attention from readers and critics than they did in the Yeltsin period, partly 
because of the apocalyptic atmosphere created by the “war on terror” in 
both West and East, but also, undoubtedly, because the Russian press and 
electronic media have been largely under state control.  
Do we need to take such literary works seriously? Are some Russian 
writers simply using right-wing ideas to exert a sensational impact on their 
readers, gain publicity, and sell more books? Although the love of 
sensationalism and commercial success have undoubtedly played a part in 
the creation and reception of their texts, some of these writers also harbour 
serious right-wing political ambitions and a desire to influence government 
policy (this is particularly obvious in the cases of Prokhanov and Limonov, 
but also in the manifesto of the “new Petersburg fundamentalists”). The 
debate over Prokhanov’s Mr Hexogen demonstrates that in the twenty-first 
century literature still had the power to provoke significant political 
discussion and controversy in Russia.   
How influential have right-wing texts been? Although it is debatable 
whether extreme right-wing literature has exerted a major impact on public 
opinion or the policies of the political leaders, it has certainly reflected the 
changing political climate of the late 1990s and early 2000s that led to the 
dominance of Putin and his Party “Edinaia Rossiia” (United Russia). 
Although I am not suggesting that literary texts (or indeed any cultural 
forms) have the power to shape or change government policy, I would argue 
that they have at least contributed to the new political environment that has 
made ultranationalist, racist, xenophobic, neo-imperialist, sexist and 
homophobic  views more “mainstream” in twenty-first century Russia.  
Nevertheless, I also agree with Walter Laqueur (2006: 501) that the 
power and popularity of the current authoritarian regime in Russia may in 
some ways “make the rise of fascism more difficult,” curbing the more 
extreme manifestations of “national-patriotic” sentiment. Although, unlike 
the electronic media, political literature by ultranationalist writers has not 
been subjected to censorship, perhaps in order to provide a safety-valve for 
critics to the right of Putin and his party, the government has sometimes 
moved to curb members of the New Right, particularly Limonov, when his 
actions and those of his militant supporters (known as the “Natsboly”) have 
become too radical even for them to permit. Ultra-nationalist ideas, 
however, have been more than a “paper tiger” in post-Soviet Russia. 
Prokhanov, whose newspaper Zavtra has a circulation of 100,000, and who 
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has been called “the leader of the patriotic opposition”, has certainly 
influenced the rhetoric of his friend, the Communist leader Gennadii 
Ziuganov.25 Towards the end of the twentieth century, ultranationalist 
thinkers such as Dugin have been prepared to moderate the public 
expression of their views in order to gain greater acceptance from the Putin 
administration. Dugin has now reinvented himself as a centrist, a Putin 
supporter, and even an “anti-fascist” (Umland 2008), and has become 
Putin’s unofficial adviser on youth policy.     
The extremist political ideas and esoteric notions associated with Dugin’s 
earlier neo-fascist writings that find reflection in Prokhanov’s novels of the 
post-Soviet period have become disturbingly acceptable in twenty-first 
century Russia. It could be argued that Laqueur’s (2006) speculation that 
the ultranationalist forces existing on the fringes of Russia’s patriotic 
movement might one day persuade the political leaders that a more radical 
and aggressive approach at home and abroad might become necessary has 
already, to some extent, come true. Putin’s supporters have shown a 
growing willingness to co-opt the imagery and rhetoric of the “patriotic 
opposition,” including some of the themes of Prokhanov and Dugin, and 
some recent statements on Georgia by Putin and Medvedev are not 
dissimilar to, if somewhat less extreme than, imperialist declarations by 
Prokhanov and Limonov.26   
I am not suggesting that “neo-fascism” will inevitably become the 
dominant ideology in Russia, but the difference between the current 
administration’s “authoritarian nationalism” and “neo-fascism” is only a 
question of degree. Literature and political writings by right-wing authors 
are helping to promote such ideas in the early twenty-first century.  
                                                 
25
 Gennadii Ziuganov, “Eshche raz o partiinoi literature,” explicitly praised Prokhanov’s 
novel Kreiserova sonata (2003) on the Communist Party website, KPRF.ru, 250/2004, 
and spoke of the need for a close link between art and politics. Prokhanov has also 
reputedly had close links with Aleksandr Barkashov, the former leader of the neo-fascist 
party Russian National Unity, and the anti-Semitic General Makashov.   
26
 Umland (2008) has pointed out that in 2008, Dugin stated in a radio interview that 
Georgia’s activities in South Ossetia amounted to “genocide,” whereupon Putin repeated 
the same term on the same day.  
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